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| __________________________ L. Schneider, Commander Battalion 6-A |
_____________________ D. L. Cate, Commander Battalion 6-B |
_______________________ E.M. Schmitz, Commander Battalion 6-C |
| COMPANY/STATION OR UNIT COMMANDER ASSIGN. |
DIVISION COMMANDER ASSIGN. | |
| BATTALION OR SECTION COMMANDER ASSIGN. |
BUREAU COMMANDER | OPERATIONS |
F-225 - REV. 2-78
CONTAINER SHIP FIRE - ZIM MONTREAL
PORT OF LONG BEACH
NOVEMBER 1981
SUMMARY:
Fire at sea;
The container vessel Zim Montreal put to sea from Japan. Eight days at sea a fire was detected in #9 hold. The ship's crew applied water through the doors of the container which could be opened only a few feet. The smoke subsided and the fire was thought to be out.
The 9th day at sea, it became obvious that the fire had not been extinguished. The crew again worked on the fire with hoselines.
The 10th day at sea, the fire became severe. The hold was sealed and CO-2 flooding was employed. This action apparently contained the fire. Sometime later, assuming the fire to be out, the hold was opened. Ventilation occurred and the fire flared. More water was applied without success until approximately 18" of water was in the hold bilge of hold #9. As the vessel neared Long Beach the hold was re-sealed and again flooded with CO-2.
The ship anchored in the Long Beach outer harbor and the situation was sized-up by the Long Beach Fire Department (LBFD). The fire area in #9 hold appeared cold and the ship was allowed to berth within the harbor.
Operations in port;
Containers topside on the hatch covers were offloaded and the hatch was opened. As air got into the hatch opening, smoke began to build up and the fire was again evident. Offloading was difficult due to heat damaged containers and the supporting racks (cells). About one hour after offloading operations within the hold had started, the Longshoremen went to lunch and all offloading ceased. A short time later the fire really grabbed on and snowballed into a major involvement deep in the stack of containers. Container stacks leaned over and several containers began to break up.
There was no effective way to ventilate. Firefighters could not get to the seat of the fire. Opening up with rotary saws failed to allow access to the seat of the fire due to tightly loaded cargo. The doors of the container could only be opened a few feet and the fire was at the closed end. There was no way to get a grip on the damaged containers to remove them. Some containers were breaking up and cargo was falling out. Smoke built up to the degree that it prohibited further use of the cranes.
It was determined that continued manual firefighting was not feasible and conditions presented too much risk to firefighters.
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It was decided to flood the hold. This operation was successful as the level of flooding continued until the fire was submersed. A total of 17-18 feet of water was necessary to accomplish extinguishment. LBFD total involvement spanned some 13-14 hours.
Loss is estimated at $5,000,000 which includes 24 containers damaged by fire and 44 that were flooded. Damage to the ship is limited to container racks and associated structure within #9 hold.
FINDINGS:
1. The Zim Montreal is a 716' container ship serving the ITS general cargo terminal
in Long Beach.
2. LBFD was first informed of the fire by the agent the night before arrival of
the vessel.
3. The original fire started in safety matches which were in a container along with
leather gloves, rubber gloves, outdoor nylon tenting material, machine screws and
bolts, sewing notions, etc.
4. Fire was possibly caused by improper loading which allowed movement and friction. It is also suspected that the matches were in a wetted condition which could
promote chemical reaction.
5. The original fire was located in a container loaded second from the bottom of
the hold.
6. Access was via catwalks with about three feet clearance. The container doors could
be opened only about 2-3 feet. The container at the bottom of the stack could not
be reached.
7. An extensive amount of breathing air was needed. LBFD activated their agreement
with L.A. County Fire Department to assist in the air supply. LBFD uses Bio
Marine-60 breathers - they do not like them.
8. Stacks of containers act as a flue and result in the sides of the containers at
the top of the stack burning out and releasing the cargo.
9. The underside of the hatch covers had a very heavy layer of soot indicating
considerable combustion had taken place prior to opening the hold.
10. The only fireworks on board were Class "C" and located two holds away from the
fire. They were not at any time exposed or considered a problem.
11. The ship's crew had drained the bunker tanks adjacent to the fire area, thus
creating a very serious unnecessary hazard.
12. All the water used in flooding the hold is considered to be contaminated and
was removed to a barge - an expensive operation.
-3-
13. Opening the hold at sea after CO-2 flooding is an error that is committed over and
over again by ship's Captains. The unexplained urge to open a hold to see if the
fire is out is poor judgment, in our opinion, and shows lack of understanding of
the fire problem.
14. LBFD was informed that the transverse bulkhead at the rear of the containers was
a sealed bulkhead. This turned out to be incorrect information. A problem did not
develop but could have and caused a massive increase in the resulting loss.
15. The ship's manifest was correct and helpful.
16. Firefighters were able to make only short trips to the fire area due to conditions
present. This is a typical condition in fires of this type and results in
extensive use of breathing air and rapid burnout of personnel.
17. Heat damaged containers, along with distorted container cells and loose cargo,
cannot be removed by normal offloading systems. The container cargo in the fire
area essentially becomes "bulk" - in effect a pile of junk trapped by remaining
container shells and distorted cell structures that must be offloaded via clam
shell or similar device.
18. The attached news article is typically inaccurate which emphasizes the need to
provide a knowledgeable press liaison person to deal with the media.
Unfortunately, commitment of massive Fire Department resources and hard working
professional firefighters doesn't seem to appear newsworthy to many reporters.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REAFFIRMED:
1. The potential of fires below decks can easily be underestimated.
2. When CO-2 flooding is employed, there is a tendency of ship's officers to open up
the hold after a period of time to see if the fire is out. The hold should remain
sealed and the CO-2 level maintained until the ship reaches port.
3. The potential of fires in ships cargo below decks must be realized - never
underestimated. This is particularly true in container vessels. There are
"experts", such as John O'Hagen who insist that containerized cargo is safer from a
fire standpoint than open cargo. It must be recognized that these "experts" are
invariably in the employee of people who are trying to reduce fire protection costs
and do not represent the opinion of experienced marine fire officers. It is true,
generally, that fewer fires will occur in containerized cargoes, however, when
fire has occurred the fire experience has been mostly bad and includes total loss
of ship as well as cargo.
4. Use of penetrating nozzles (aircraft type) on container fires has potential. LAFD
harbor area personnel have conducted tests on this technique and have concluded
that it is a viable tactic. Chief Fisher of LBFD feels that this tool would have
been of considerable benefit in their effort.
5. Unloading stacks of containers adjacent to the involved containers should be
pursued as early as possible to provide improved access to the seat of the fire.
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6. A sufficient number of heat monitoring units should be placed throughout the hold
in appropriate locations. Smoky conditions restrict the ability to evaluate
changing conditions. LBFD feels they needed more information, some of which could
be provided by these devices.
7. It is important to rip into and/or remove the involved container as quickly as
possible - not a time to be bashful.
8. Obtain the ship's manifest as soon as possible. Immediately call for an interpreter
if there is a language problem. The crew possesses information we must have to plan
operations.
9. Access in container holds is via catwalks with extremely restricted clearance.
Super caution and strong enforcement of safety practices are mandatory, such as;
working in pairs, monitoring location of all personnel at all times, alternative
escape routes, stand-by rescue teams, etc.
10. Doors of containers can usually be opened only 2-3 feet and even if the doors are
fully opened , hosestreams will not penetrate most cargo loads.
11. Do not assume fires of this type are out because the container appears cool and
there is no smoke. Instead, determine that the fire is out when the container is
offloaded to a safe location on shore and the cargo is unloaded and overhauled.
12. Do not open the hold until sufficient personnel and equipment are ready to go and a
comprehensive plan is established that includes all concerned parties. Insist that
at least one ship's surveyor is employed and on scene. Also insist that someone be
on the scene at all times who has the authority to expend corporate funds for any
request of the fire department Incident Commander.
13. Container stacks provide flues for fires below and often the containers near the
top of the stack will receive the most heat damage.
14. Fires that occur deep in the hold may accelerate suddenly when air reaches the hot
area and create a rapidly developing personnel hazard. Always have a rapid
withdrawal plan with as many alternative escape routes as possible.
15. Do not drain bunker tanks adjacent to the involved hold. This increases the hazard
and could lead to an explosion. Liquid of any type is a good heat transfer medium.
Fill the tanks if necessary and monitor the temperature of the fuel. Circulate
cooler fuel from other tanks if heating becomes evident.
16. Adequate ventilation of lower holds is just about impossible with equipment
available to the fire department. Consider using the ship's system, if any.
17. Decks become slippery when wet - use caution. At the Long Beach fire a chief
officer slipped and broke his shoulder. Newspapers provide a fair non-skid
protection for immediate need.
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18. Planning for fire department operations in shipboard fires will require a planning
meeting that may include representatives of the following as well as other
interested parties; USCG, Port Warden, Ship's Master, longshoremen, crane, barge
and truck operators, etc.
19. Any plan will include the below items along with other considerations to fit each
situation;
a. The fire department IC will be given absolute authority to decide when
conditions require flooding, discontinuance of operations or removal of the
ship from the harbor.
b. A definitive plan will be established and agreed upon by all responsible
representatives. The plan will include progressive alternatives to cover any
anticipated possibility.
c. A representative with authority to expend corporate funds as may be required
shall be at the scene at all times. We may not have time to allow a call to
"the office" for a decision.
d. Several alternative escape routes will be established; aerial ladders,
fireboat/life guard boat, lifelines, Jacobs ladder, etc.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. Inspection and size-up of the situation must be thorough and deliberate. Do not
assume anything - be positive in all evaluations.
2. A definitive plan must be established that includes acceptance of all parties that
have an interest. It must be established that in turn for commitment of Fire
Department resources, the Fire Dept. Incident Commander will have the final say in
any issue that involves handling the emergency. In the planning stages it must be
determined who will pay for what - and very important, the person authorized to do
the paying must be available to the IC at all times.
3. Conditions aboard the Zim Montreal required strong commitment of resources
including Emergency Air, HU, RA, on stand-by and an adequate ICS staff including
S & M, Public Relations, FPB, etc.
4. If conditions develop that are worse than anticipated by fire officers - "they
blew it" in the planning and size-up phase.
5. The fire in Long Beach presented difficult conditions for their fire department.
In handling this fire, LBFD learned from their experience. In openly communicating
with us, they have provided an opportunity for us to learn from this fire also.
COMMANDERS, BATTALION 6
LAFD
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