JOHN C. GERARD
CHIEF ENGINEER AND GENERAL MANAGER

October 1, 1981

TO:             Division Commanders, Division 2

FROM:           Battalion Commanders, Battalion 6

SUBJECT:        SHIP FIRE - M.S. Kartini

SUMMARY:

While enroute from New Orleans to the Orient with a full load of coal, the M. S. Kartini, a bulk carrier, made port in Long Beach Harbor to take on additional bunker fuel. While in port, heating of the cargo was noted. The Kartini set to sea, but returned on September 9, 1981 due to increased heat and fuming of the cargo.

On September 9 and September 10, representatives of the USCG, Long Beach Fire Department, Los Angeles City Fire Department, ship surveyors, etc., inspected the vessel. It was concluded that the heating of the cargo was serious and progressive.

Expert Coal Consultant, DR. W. F. Berry of Pittsburgh, was brought in to evaluate the situation. Dr. Berry advised immediate off-loading of the cargo. It was his opinion that the Kartini would suffer severe damage from the acid which was forming and ignition of the cargo was imminent.

It was determined that the only local berth open that could accommodate a vessel of this size and draft was Berth 52 in the Los Angeles Harbor.

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Tide conditions required immediate action and at approximately 0600 hours on September 11, the Kartini was berthed at the designated location. Off-loading was started with a nitrogen blanket in the vapor space of all holds. Smoke was emitting from several holds, but off-loading progressed slowly without any unusual events.

On September 13, at 0208 hours, LAFD received an alarm for a fire aboard a ship at Berth 52. A waterfront assignment of three engine companies, two truck companies, two fireboats and Battalion 6 was dispatched.

Upon arrival, the cargo in Hold #7-A was well involved with fire and producing large quantities of smoke and flammable gasses. The vessel was 30' from the wharf, as a result of the hull setting on the bottom of the berth at low tide. This had caused off-loading with land-based cranes to be discontinued until higher tide.

Firefighters made access via aerial ladders and controlled the fire with the minimal amount of water necessary as wet coal presents more of a hazard than dry coal.

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ACTION TAKEN:

After berthing at Berth 52 in the east channel, a meeting was conducted by LAFD (Battalion 6) aboard the ship. The meeting was attended by the Master of the Ship, the ship's First Officer, ship agents, surveyor and attorneys, Port Warden, USCG representatives and Coal Expert, Dr. W. F. Berry.

It was determined that we were faced with three potential hazards:

1.  Flash fires occurring in hold void spaces which contained several flammable
    gases, including methane.

2.  If flooding operations became necessary, steam and/or hydrogen gas explosions
    would probably occur.

3.  Possible acid conditions on bunker tank tops and possible corrosive action allowing
    burning cargo to enter vapor space in bunker fuel tanks located beneath cargo
    bottoms, with possible explosion or fire.

OTHER HAZARDS

1.  Ship's draft - 40' in 35' channel, sloping to 41'.

2.  Ship sliding away from wharf during low tide, 10' to 30'.

3.  Access to ship during low tide by LAFD aerial ladder and fireboat boom or
    Jacobs ladder.

4.  Firefighters working in toxic atmosphere.

5.  Firefighters working in close proximity of overhead cranes.

EXPOSURES:

1.  Bulk ore ship berthed 500' south of Kartini and taking on bunkers from
    bunker barge.

2.  Bunker barge berthed across channel at berth 60.

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3.  Pleasure craft traversing channel to 22nd Street marina.

4.  Fishing boats with live-ins across channel.

5.  Large marinas approximately 300 yards west.

STRATEGY:

Strategy adopted included plan to save ship, cargo and wharf. Three plans were adopted, Plans A. B. and C.

Plan A

1.  Off-load cargo by cranes to wharf.

2.  Control surface fires with hand lines, using a minimum amount of water.

3.  Prepare for flooding of holds by use of multiple supply lines from fireboats.

4.  Order adjacent ships to be prepared to leave their berth within 30 minutes notice.

5.  Remove bunker barges.

6.  Stop all movement of other vessels in the east channel.

7.  Utilize a minimum amount of firefighters in toxic atmosphere, with standby
    firefighters in safe area.

8.  Develop and continue to monitor temperatures and atmosphere in each hold. Also,
    acid conditions in bilge. Temperature of bunkers remained cool at all times during
    the incident.

9.  Pump inert gas (nitrogen) into vapor space in bunker tanks (80% full load,
    167 tons).

Plan B

1.  Flood Hold #8 with sea water from fireboat at the wharf.

2.  Evacuate all personnel from the ship.

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3.  Manufacture a "deluge manifold system" for flooding at lowest possible level.
    Manifold constructed while allowed for progressive depth up to 50')

4.  Evacuate bulk loading installation at Berth #49.

5.  Flooding at this time would cause ship to settle on the bottom.

6.  Salt water would contaminate cargo.

Plan C

1.  Remove ship to outer harbor anchorage, designated by the Port Warden and Captain
    of the port.

2.  Flood cargo holds, utilizing fire boats.

3.  Remove all persons from ship.

ALTERNATE TO PLAN C

1.  Remove ship from port and scuttle, USCG responsibility.

Plan A was implemented on September 11, 1981 and adhered to until final extinguishment. On September 13, 1981, at approximately 0200 hours, a substantial surface fire erupted in Hold 7A-7B, requiring a multiple alarm assignment to control. The fire was successfully controlled in short order, and Plan A was continued.

Periodic meetings were held with all interested parties aboard the Kartini. decisions were made based upon the most recent conditions aboard the vessel. Fire companies were on deck and were rotated during this time with fresh companies.

A marine chemist was on scene evaluating conditions and periodically reporting to the fire officer in charge. The Mobil lab was utilized on September 13 and provided valuable assistance which corresponded with

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Temperature and PH levels varied in each hold, sometimes to critical conditions during the first week of operation. On September 13, conditions had slightly worsened. Temperatures had risen to dangerous levels in several other holds.

Because of the inadequate type of cranes being utilized and the time factor necessary to get additional cranes of adequate size in operation, it was decided that an attempt should be made to remove the ships bunkers. The removal of bunkers would lighten the ship and lessen the draft to about 18' to 24'. It would also lessen the hazard of a fire in the bunker tanks.

The Captain of the Port had a USCG strike team flown in from San Francisco to accomplish this task. However, the task of removing the bunkers was too difficult and would require approximately three days to accomplish. The plan was therefore abandoned. Removal of the waste in the bilge was also abandoned because to do so would require drawing bilge water (Ph 2 content) through discharge lines that ran through the bunker tanks.

On September 17 additional larger capacity cranes were placed into service to expedite off-loading operations.

TACTICS:

Tactics applied included supply lines from land based companies, to the stern over the aerial ladder. Lines, 2 1/2" and 1 1/2", were positioned from the stern to port and starboard of Holds #9, #8 and #7-A and 7-B. Similar hose lines were positioned to the bow and advanced to cover forward of #7-A hold to #1 hold. These hose lines were supplied from a fireboat located on the port bow of the vessel. An aerial ladder was

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placed on the starboard bow to provide access to the bow and also provide for an escape if necessary.

A boom from the fireboat was utilized for this purpose on the port bow. A Jacobs ladder was secured on the port bow to facilitate firefighters escape on the off shore side of the vessel. All hatches and manholes were placed in open position to facilitate ventilation and lessen the force of any possible explosion. Six 3 1/2" hose supply lines were laid from 400' forward of the bow on the wharf and continued on deck from the bow to the #7A hatch. These six hoselines were positioned to supply the "deluge manifold system" if Plan B were implemented. This system would be supplied by fireboat.

A small fireboat stood off in the channel in a clear area and served as a rescue boat for firefighters that might be forced into the water.

The Harbor Patrol maintained control of boat traffic in the channel. The LACO lifeguard patrol boat stood by to assist in the event of water rescue. The LAPD closed off Miner Street at 22nd Street to allow for movement of fire apparatus.

The ICS was utilized as adopted for shipboard firefighting operations as follows:

a.  Incident command post positioned on the bridge of the vessel.

b.  Suppression and rescue (deck command) positioned on main deck.

c.  Deck staging located at stern abaft the superstructure.

d.  IC sedan (Battalion Aide) located in parking lot at west side of wharf.

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e. Marine Division - large fire boat - port bow of vessel.

f. Logistics - at base and located at north end of wharf.

CONCLUSIONS:

Although this incident posed many problems, the Department analysis of the situation and actions taken were very successful. Many serious decisions and quick action was necessary during the first four or five days.

This Department retained command of the situation from beginning to end. We received outstanding cooperation from the ship's representatives and also from all other interested parties, especially the USCG. The professional expertise rendered by Dr. W. F. Berry was immeasurable. The plan developed allowed for alternatives and contingency plans were established which allowed for great flexibility. This was an absolute must because of the many changes in conditions, hour-to-hour, day-by-day.

Safety to our personnel was paramount and almost every company was briefed regarding their responsibilities and hazards present prior to their being committed. Members were instructed regarding escape routes available and water rescue plans implemented.

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Many companies from throughout the City worked on this fire. Some of the harbor companies worked several days in succession with some personnel engaged for up to 15 hours without relief, and no complaints were received by the Battalion Commander.

_____________________________
Lawrence Schneider, Commander
Battalion 6, "A" Platoon

_____________________________
Donald L. Cate, Commander
Battalion 6, "B" Platoon

_____________________________
Eugene Schmitz, Commander
Battalion 6, "C" Platoon

LS:1m